THE CARRANZA ADMINISTRATION 1917–1920

In October 1916, Mexicans elected delegates to the Constitutional Convention that Carranza had convoked the previous month. Even though there was only one candidate in some districts, in others there was real competition between would-be delegates. Carranza stipulated that those who had aided any other faction in the Revolution or who had served Huerta in a civil or a military capacity would be ineligible to become a delegate.

 This provision prevented any delegates from representing Villa or Zapata. Also largely excluded from the Convention were agrarian and working class interests as well as representatives of the two main conservative institutions—the old federal army and the Church. The turnout for the election, which did not exceed 30 percent, reflected the lack of interest in the technical issues involved in what was widely billed as a rewriting of the 1857 Constitution. It also indicated a willingness to give the Carrancista leadership a free hand in a process that seemingly had little direct local relevance.

The delegates to the Convention reflected the youth and middle-class origins of the Constitutionalist leadership. Of the 138 whose age is known, twenty-nine were in their twenties, sixty-two were in their thirties, and thirty-one were in their forties. An estimated 85 percent of the delegates were white-collar professionals, including sixty-two lawyers, eighteen teachers, sixteen engineers, sixteen physicians, and fourteen journalists. Carranza presented the Convention delegates, who assembled in Querétaro, with a draft of a new constitution. Delegates could then approve or modify the draft on an article-by-article basis. The draft Carranza presented was very close to the 1857 constitution and did not greatly increase government power. It left largely unaddressed the needs of the landless and workers. It reflected not only the low priority Carranza placed on social reform, as opposed to political reform, but also his belief that social reform could be best addressed by legislation, not a constitution.

Despite having dictated the process for selecting Convention delegates, Carranza proved unable to dominate the Convention once it convened. A radical majority emerged that sought a strong federal government that could challenge the Church and implement social reform. Two figures dominated this reformist wing of the Convention. One, Francisco Múgica, a thirty-two-year old general from Michoacán, represented the reformist elements of the Constitutionalist army and considered redistribution of wealth as a worthy goal in its own right. The other was Obregón, who saw social reforms as necessary for building a solid base of political support.

Although he was not a delegate, Obregón promoted more radical positions and established friendships at the Querétaro Convention that would later prove invaluable to him.

Article 3 of the completed constitution decreed education would be compulsory and without charge. As with other articles, it was out of touch with Mexican reality. With just over 1 percent of the budget earmarked for education, for most Mexican children school attendance was only wishful thinking. The article left education in the hands of states and municipalities, the entities least able or willing to implement it.

Article 27 granted the government the power to control land use for “public utility,” thus providing the legal basis for Mexico’s far-reaching land reform. This article also declared the government owned “all minerals . . . such as . . . petroleum. . ..” It reflected the thinking of Andrés Molina Enríquez, the author of Los grandes problemas nacionales. He rebutted charges that the article was “communistic,” noting that it merely represented a return to the colonial model. In that model, the Crown, or its successor, the state, could never relinquish ultimate ownership of land. According to Molina Enríquez’s thinking, even if individuals were allowed to use land, the Crown and later the state at all times had the power to transfer that land to a new owner for what it considered a better use.

Article 123 contained a rich lode of labor rights, including the right to unionize and strike, the eight-hour day, and equal pay for equal work regardless of one’s gender or nationality. This article also ignored Mexican reality. It prohibited child labor in an economy where such labor was essential for the survival of many families. It was clear to all that the provisions of Article 123 would not be implemented immediately.

Rather, they formed a statement of intent—a promise of better things to come. Miner Nicolás Cano, one of the few workers at the Convention, was prescient in noting that by protecting only “legal” strikes, Article 123 left the door open for business and government to jointly declare strikes illegal and oppress labor. The immediate impact of Article 123 was to convince the labor and peasant movements that they did not need a Villa or a Zapata to be included in the new order.

To correct what was perceived as an excessively weak presidency created by the 1857 constitution, the 1917 document created a strong presidency. Article 76 granted the Senate— which became subservient to the president—the right to remove state governors. Article 71 allowed the president to introduce legislation. As a result of this provision, most of the legislation passed for the rest of the century was in the form of presidential initiative. Article 72 allowed the president to veto legislation, but permitted Congress to override the veto with a two-thirds majority.

The constitution placed one crucial limit on this strong presidency. Article 83 prohibited both immediate presidential reelection and a later return to the presidency à la Porfirio Díaz in 1884. This reflected the belief that the ills of the Porfiriato resulted from Díaz’s repeated reelection.

With the single exception of 1928, this prohibition remained for the rest of the century. In addition, the immediate reelection of mayors and governors was prohibited. These prohibitions remain a cardinal principle of Mexican politics and have had a major impact on shaping the political system.

The 1917 constitution laid the foundation for an activist federal government that could defend the interests of poor Mexicans vis-à-vis hacendados and foreign capitalists. However, this activism took an unexpected form. Carranza and his successors not only wielded the power granted them in the constitution but also viewed it as a document that they could review, amend, or ignore to suit their generally conservative purposes. Despite its spotty application, the 1917 constitution did shape government action, and it remains in force to this day. It significantly influenced social thinking throughout Latin America, and its progressive provisions were widely adopted in legislation and constitutions elsewhere in the region.

In March 1917, elections were held to legitimize Carranza’s presidency. There was no organized opposition, and Carranza received more than 97 percent of the vote. Apparently the only ones to take the election seriously were foreigners. The British minister reported, “My chauffeur could not conceal his amusement when I told him that I wished to go and see the elections.”

Carranza faced a number of challenges once he assumed the presidency. He had to establish control vis-à-vis his rivals, especially Villa and Zapata, who still led irregular forces. Peasants and workers, having been mobilized by the Revolution, demanded that the government take measures to meet their aspirations. At the local level, entrenched warlords and active-duty generals, many of whom obtained power through the Revolution, defended their prerogatives. Implementing any sort of change required undercutting local interests and rebuilding loyalties to the national government. Given Mexico’s economic disarray, merely feeding the population presented a major challenge.

A fusion of Sonoran and Coahuilan groups formed Carranza’s ruling coalition. This leadership, with its northern middle-class roots, prioritized nationalism, not social reform. Just as with Madero before him, Carranza felt the Revolution was over. In June 1917, one of oilman Weetman Pearson’s representatives wrote:

A tendency to conservatism is observable now that the government is well established and is not so dependent on the radical military element. Undoubtedly Carranza is doing his utmost to free himself from the extremists, and the most hopeful sign is, that he is commencing to take into the government offices, some of the old regime.

Carranza shared the conviction of the Porfirian elite that land reform would be a disaster for the Mexican economy and that it would sharply reduce agricultural production. In keeping with this notion, he returned many seized estates to their pre-Revolutionary owners. He felt this would increase tax collection and food production and win the political support of those who recouped their land.

Carranza not only restored large estates to their pre-Revolutionary owners but also declared that he did not think “the agrarian problem important.” During the five years he exercised power, Carranza distributed only 988,000 acres—roughly the size of a large northern hacienda—to 67,193 beneficiaries.

Resistance to the Constitutionalists continued in Morelos, even though Carranza’s army returned to occupy the state in 1917. By 1919, Zapata’s dream had vanished as all the cities and haciendas were reoccupied and lands were returned to their former owners. The remaining Zapatistas were forced into the mountains. They no longer had a clear position. Some made overtures to the government while others spoke highly of the Russian Revolution.

Early in 1919, Zapata contacted Jesús Guajardo, a Carrancista colonel whom Zapata had heard was at odds with his commander. Zapata, desperate for men and supplies, suggested that Guajardo defect. Guajardo pretended he was deserting, along with his troops and their weapons. To convince Zapata of his sincerity, Guajardo even had his troops shoot men who had deserted Zapata and joined his force.

Guajardo met Zapata at Chinameca hacienda in Morelos. Upon entering the hacienda courtyard on April 10, 1919, Zapata was cut down by gunfire from an ambush that Guajardo had laid for him. For his part in the ambush, Guajardo was given 50,000 pesos and promoted to general. After Zapata’s death, the Zapatistas ceased to be a major political force. However, some Zapatistas did remain in the hills until 1920, when the political climate became more favorable.

Many of Carranza’s civil servants, especially at the municipal level, had served under Díaz. He purged progressives from the government and the army and replaced them with politicians and unprincipled militarists.              

Carranza’s civilian appointees began a trend toward personal enrichment through public office on a scale previously unmatched. Such enrichment not only satisfied the desires of those holding power but also bought off challengers. Although Carranza was personally honest, corruption became widespread during his administration. The tone of government changed so radically that by 1920 it was difficult to see any relation between government action and the 1917 constitution. After serving as a senator and governor under Díaz, Carranza, like Madero before him, had no desire to implement sweeping changes.

While Carranza failed to use the promise of social reform to consolidate power, there was someone who was a master at it—his old comrade-in-arms, Álvaro Obregón. After the 1917 Constitutional Convention, amid reports of growing rivalry between the two revolutionary leaders, Obregón resigned his position as secretary of war and “retired” to his estate in Sonora. While there, he profited greatly from brokering Sonora’s chickpea trade. Obregón kept abreast of political events and traveled to the United States, where he met with Secretary of State Robert Lansing.

By 1920, Obregón had allied himself with middle-class military men who were dissatisfied with the tenor of Carranza’s government. His new allies resented the unfulfilled promises of the

Revolution and the increasing power of hacendados. The enrichment of Carrancista officials,

widespread repression, and Carranza’s authorization of the assassination of Zapata only served to increase their dissatisfaction.

In 1919, Carranza attempted to impose his ambassador in Washington, Ignacio Bonillas, as his successor. Bonillas, a virtually unknown engineer who had trained at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, had such close ties to the United States that he was disparagingly referred to as “Meester Bonillas.” Carranza thought he could control Bonillas even after his term was over and thus maintain de facto power. He knew he could not control the outstanding general of the Revolution, Obregón.

In June 1919, Obregón announced his own presidential candidacy. His whistle-stop tours around the country drew enthusiastic crowds. Obregón was already experienced in mass politics, having promised the Yaqui land in exchange for their fighting in the Revolution and having promised workers labor rights in exchange for their formation of battalions during the Revolution. To bolster his presidential candidacy, he turned to organized labor for support. The response Obregón received in Tampico was typical of the labor support he received nationwide. There, at worker’s convention, responding to his charisma, his military record, and his promises of reform, endorsed Obregón over Bonillas by a vote of 1,082 to three in a straw poll.

While Obregón was campaigning, Carranza subpoenaed him to testify in a case involving an officer charged with rebellion. After arriving in Mexico City, Obregón, fearing arrest or assassination, fled to Guerrero disguised as a rail worker. There he formed an alliance with remnants of the Zapatista movement and called for revolt against Carranza. Obregón had the backing of reform-minded military men, peasants, and workers, who saw in him the hope for change. He also had strong backing in his home state of Sonora, where on April 23, 1920, two generals, Plutarco Calles and Adolfo de la Huerta, issued the Plan of Agua Prieta, which repudiated Carranza’s government. As was the case with Carranza’s Plan of Guadalupe, it lacked specific provisions for social reform.

Carranza failed to end rural violence, to fulfill the promises of the 1917 constitution, or to resolve the considerable economic problems the Revolution had created. He had little to offer the middle class, which had emerged as a major political force in the revolutionary army and at the Querétaro convention. The army was alienated by his having reduced military spending. The world recession following the end of the First World War exacerbated poverty in Mexico, making a mockery of the revolutionary slogans that had stoked the hopes of ordinary Mexicans.

On May 7, 1920, realizing that he had little political or military support, Carranza filled sixty rail cars with his backers and their weapons, files, and possessions, as well as gold bars from the national treasury. He set out along the traditional path of Mexico’s fallen leaders, down from the highlands toward Veracruz. He planned to reestablish his government there and launch a counteroffensive from the coast, just as he had successfully done in 1915.

However, Carranza found the rail line had been blocked by rebels well before he reached Veracruz. He abandoned the train and reached the village of Tlaxcalantongo, Puebla, on horseback. There, troops under the command of Rodolfo Herrero assassinated the president in the hut where he was sleeping. Herrero, who had ties to Generals Manuel Paláez and Félix Díaz, held a grudge since Carranza and Carranza’s appointee as governor of Puebla had ordered his father killed.

Obregon’s rapid victory in Mexico’s last successful armed revolt reflected the erosion of Carranza’s support. At the same time, given his military record, Obregón attracted broad military support as well as the backing of many workers and peasants who felt he would carry out the reforms promised in the constitution.

Given his background, it is not surprising that Carranza largely ignored the powerful social demands that emerged during the Revolution. Little progress was made at instilling democracy, as the elections that were held during Carranza’s term were generally considered a farce. Members of opposing factions were not allowed to nominate candidates and there were widespread accusations of fraud. Finally, as became obvious with the Plan of Agua Prieta, no means of presidential succession had been instituted.

Carranza’s strongest legacy is providing an institutional framework—the 1917 constitution— which his successors could build on. Carranza’s nationalism forms another part of his legacy. He increased the taxes on oil companies seven-fold between 1917 and 1920. He was not afraid to challenge foreigners’ property rights and existing contracts to further his nationalistic goals. He was not anti-capitalist or even anti-foreign and did not seek to eliminate foreign investment, but to control it. Carranza unsuccessfully attempted to force foreign oil companies to accept that the Mexican government, by virtue of Article 27, could radically redefine their oil rights.