THE OBREGÓN ADMINISTRATION, 1920–1924

Led by the most talented general to emerge from the civil wars, Álvaro Obregón, the Sonorans set out to modernize the country along classical capitalist lines, while at the same time realizing personal ambitions that had been frustrated in the stifling atmosphere of the late Porfiriato. Dudley Ankerson, 1984

Following Carranza’s death, Congress selected Adolfo de la Huerta, a former governor of Sonora, as provisional president to serve the remainder of Carranza’s term. Since De la Huerta had not been a military rival of Villa as Carranza had been, he was able to persuade Villa to surrender. In exchange for his surrender, Villa was given Canutillo Hacienda, a 163,000-acre spread situated at the headwaters of the Río Conchos in Durango. Villa was to be defended by a fifty-man guard of his choosing, whose salary was paid by the government. Villa felt such an arrangement would protect

him from his many enemies. In fact, he selected Canutillo because it was easily defendable.

While at Canutillo, Villa created a semi-autonomous military colony, the model he had hoped to implement throughout northern Mexico. He showed his concern for education by establishing a school on the premises. He later commented, “When the day comes that a school teacher earns more than an army general, Mexico will be saved”

Other rebels laid down their arms during De la Huerta’s presidency. Félix Díaz, who had revolted once again in southern Mexico, was allowed to sail to exile in the United States. Many Zapatistas were incorporated into the regular army. De la Huerta not only left Mexico a more peaceful country after his six-month presidency but also substantially reduced the size of the bloated military.

On September 5, 1920, Obregón, facing only nominal opposition, received 95 percent of the votes for president. Since Bonillas had withdrawn his candidacy and Obregón’s backers controlled nearly all the polling places, once again the election served not to select a president but to legitimize a military victor.

On December 1, 1920, Obregón took the oath of office as president. He formed an administration independent of any one sector. Porfirian hacendados were played off against peasants, workers, and emerging industrialists, all of whom were overshadowed by foreign interests and the government.

Local military leaders who had supported Obregón in his showdown with Carranza were rewarded with considerable freedom of action as well as government support. Many of these generals controlled their states and regions like oriental despots.

While accepting the reality of local warlords, Obregón did begin the long process of political centralization. Many local figures were bought off with government jobs or forced into exile. Cabinet members and military commanders were amply rewarded for their support with promotions and the possibility of using their position for personal enrichment. To further extend his power base, Obregón formally allied with the major labor federation, the Regional Federation of Mexican Workers (CROM).

During the Obregón administration, the number and diversity of new organizations was unprecedented. Labor unions, peasant leagues, union federations, and political parties all sought to shape post-revolutionary society to their preferences. Their being organized around regional power centers rather than at the national level limited the effectiveness of these groups. Their sheer numbers and their diverse demands also diminished their impact on policy.

Obregón did not attempt to contain the masses through repression as Huerta had. Rather, reform—or the promise of reform—was used as a means of political control. Obregón’s indulging in radical rhetoric served to whet appetites and make the impoverished look to his administration for change. The terms “class struggle,” “socialism,” and “anti-imperialism” flowed easily from officials’ tongues.

Land reform became a political tool. By the time Obregón left office in 1924, 2.7 million acres, or 3.5 percent of agrarian land, had been distributed. In contrast, as late as 1925, some 79 million acres were foreign owned. His lack of enthusiasm for land reform is understandable, since his personal estate covered 8,645 acres and employed 1,500 workers. Obregón was aware that a sweeping land reform would alienate his most important base of support, the army, many of whose officers had recently acquired haciendas. Obregón stated that subdividing estates would reduce production. He felt that if haciendas were subdivided, “We would put to flight foreign capital, which at this moment we need more than ever.”

Land reform did permit Obregón to consolidate power. In Morelos, where surviving Zapatistas had helped him oust Carranza, Obregón promoted extensive land reform. By 1923, 115 of the 150 towns in the state had received land. Similarly, given the degree of peasant mobilization in Chihuahua, Obregón felt he had no choice but to expropriate the estates of the Terrazas and the Creels and redistribute a large part of them to Chihuahua’s landless.

During the 1920s, given the weakness of the central government, state governors had the leeway to experiment with radical social change. Such change often involved the position of women, land holding, and the role of the Church. These state governments dealt with the major issues incorporated in the 1917 constitution, and their projects were known as laboratories of the

Revolution.

Conservatives furthered their interests, with or without the blessing of the central government. Landowners in Yucatán assassinated progressive governor Felipe Carrillo Puerto in 1924, thus ending his “socialist” experiment. In Chiapas, the governor used all of his power to obstruct the work of the local Agrarian Commissions and to destroy the agrarian movement. In many areas, agrarian leaders who formed peasant leagues to push for their rights under land reform laws were declared “bandits” and murdered. Generals cooperated with local hacendados and state governors to drive off land reform beneficiaries. They used the army as a rural police force, and it sometimes turned its weapons on peasants to maintain the status quo.

Obregón increased social mobility for the middle class. Its members enriched themselves quickly, taking advantage of the power the government gave them. During the 1920s, they became virtually indistinguishable from those whom they had fought during the Revolution. Often their wealth was based on public works contracts or simply on pillaging the public treasury.

By 1922, speculation had begun on who Mexico’s next president would be and how he would be selected. Pancho Villa told an interviewer at Canutillo that he was considering getting back into politics. Villa was not at all discreet, stating, “I have told all my friends the same thing, just wait, when they least expect it, the opportunity will come . . .”42 He bragged that he could “mobilize 40,000 men in 40 minutes.”

Villa also volunteered this statement concerning Adolfo de la Huerta, who had fallen out with Obregón, “Adolfo is a very fine person and very intelligent, he wouldn’t make a bad president.”44 It is not known if this 1922 interview contributed to Villa’s death or not.

In any case, on July 20, 1923, as De la Huerta’s presidential ambitions began to pose a serious threat to the government, gunfire riddled Villa’s car as he drove into town from Canutillo, killing him instantly. In his magisterial biography of Villa, historian Friedrich Katz concluded, “There can, on the whole, be little doubt that the Mexican government was not only implicated in but probably also organized the assassination of Villa.”

Likely Obregón took seriously Villa’s boast that he could mobilize 40,000 men in forty minutes and feared that they would be mobilized in favor of De la Huerta. He also felt that Villa would rally nationalist sentiment by criticizing a pact, known as the Bucareli Accords, which he had made with the United States.

During his term, Obregón personally chose those who would serve as congressmen, senators, and governors. His departure from the presidency began another Mexican political tradition—the out-going president selecting his successor without popular control or even popular involvement.

Obregón chose Plutarco Elías Calles, another general from Sonora, to succeed him. When Calles’s nomination was announced in 1923, General Adolfo de la Huerta, who had served as Obregón’s secretary of finance, attempted a coup. He followed the example set in 1920 by Obregón, who had revolted when he was not selected to succeed Carranza.

De la Huerta’s revolt drew some 50,000 followers, mainly in the north, and had the backing of conservatives, hacendados, and Catholic leaders. Cuts in military spending had once again alienated the army, so half the generals and 40 percent of the troops joined him. The revolt drew support from independent labor, those fearing Calles’s radicalism, and nationalists who resented Obregón’s compromising of Mexican sovereignty by signing the Bucareli Accords.47 Obregón’s alliance with peasants, a product of his populist style, served him well. Feeling that

Calles offered the best hope of land distribution, 120,000 peasants attacked De la Huerta’s lines

of communication, sabotaged supplies, and formed small military units. In addition, U.S.-supplied arms, ammunition, and airplanes, as well as support from organized labor, contributed to De la Huerta’s defeat.

The revolt lasted three months and cost about 7,000 lives. After personally leading the campaign against the rebels, Obregón had fifty-four of its leaders, his former comrades-in-arms, shot. The De la Huerta revolt permanently weakened the military as an institution, since so many generals died or fled into exile. De la Huerta took refuge in Los Angeles, where he gave voice lessons. When elections were finally held, Calles received almost 90 percent of the vote. Most Mexicans

showed little interest and abstained. It was hard to excite potential voters, since opposition was

token at best.

Assassinating Villa and creating schools were exceptions to what was generally a non-activist presidency. Most of the large estates that existed during the Porfiriato were intact at the end of Obregón’s term, although ownership of many of them had passed to generals. It was only in 1922 that industrial production surpassed the level of the late Porfiriato. In 1924, Mexicans probably ate less, had fewer jobs, and enjoyed no greater political rights than they had before the Revolution.

Although the Obregonistas took power under the mantle of Revolution, there was little change. Rather, they destroyed Porfirian privilege, such as monopolies and special tax concessions, and opened opportunity for themselves. These reforms were not addressed to the masses. Obregón, like Madero and Carranza before him, was basically a nineteenth-century liberal whose main goal was to update and streamline Mexican capitalism. Obregón did have the distinction of being the first Mexican president in generations to complete his term and leave office.

THE CARRANZA ADMINISTRATION 1917–1920

In October 1916, Mexicans elected delegates to the Constitutional Convention that Carranza had convoked the previous month. Even though there was only one candidate in some districts, in others there was real competition between would-be delegates. Carranza stipulated that those who had aided any other faction in the Revolution or who had served Huerta in a civil or a military capacity would be ineligible to become a delegate.

 This provision prevented any delegates from representing Villa or Zapata. Also largely excluded from the Convention were agrarian and working class interests as well as representatives of the two main conservative institutions—the old federal army and the Church. The turnout for the election, which did not exceed 30 percent, reflected the lack of interest in the technical issues involved in what was widely billed as a rewriting of the 1857 Constitution. It also indicated a willingness to give the Carrancista leadership a free hand in a process that seemingly had little direct local relevance.

The delegates to the Convention reflected the youth and middle-class origins of the Constitutionalist leadership. Of the 138 whose age is known, twenty-nine were in their twenties, sixty-two were in their thirties, and thirty-one were in their forties. An estimated 85 percent of the delegates were white-collar professionals, including sixty-two lawyers, eighteen teachers, sixteen engineers, sixteen physicians, and fourteen journalists. Carranza presented the Convention delegates, who assembled in Querétaro, with a draft of a new constitution. Delegates could then approve or modify the draft on an article-by-article basis. The draft Carranza presented was very close to the 1857 constitution and did not greatly increase government power. It left largely unaddressed the needs of the landless and workers. It reflected not only the low priority Carranza placed on social reform, as opposed to political reform, but also his belief that social reform could be best addressed by legislation, not a constitution.

Despite having dictated the process for selecting Convention delegates, Carranza proved unable to dominate the Convention once it convened. A radical majority emerged that sought a strong federal government that could challenge the Church and implement social reform. Two figures dominated this reformist wing of the Convention. One, Francisco Múgica, a thirty-two-year old general from Michoacán, represented the reformist elements of the Constitutionalist army and considered redistribution of wealth as a worthy goal in its own right. The other was Obregón, who saw social reforms as necessary for building a solid base of political support.

Although he was not a delegate, Obregón promoted more radical positions and established friendships at the Querétaro Convention that would later prove invaluable to him.

Article 3 of the completed constitution decreed education would be compulsory and without charge. As with other articles, it was out of touch with Mexican reality. With just over 1 percent of the budget earmarked for education, for most Mexican children school attendance was only wishful thinking. The article left education in the hands of states and municipalities, the entities least able or willing to implement it.

Article 27 granted the government the power to control land use for “public utility,” thus providing the legal basis for Mexico’s far-reaching land reform. This article also declared the government owned “all minerals . . . such as . . . petroleum. . ..” It reflected the thinking of Andrés Molina Enríquez, the author of Los grandes problemas nacionales. He rebutted charges that the article was “communistic,” noting that it merely represented a return to the colonial model. In that model, the Crown, or its successor, the state, could never relinquish ultimate ownership of land. According to Molina Enríquez’s thinking, even if individuals were allowed to use land, the Crown and later the state at all times had the power to transfer that land to a new owner for what it considered a better use.

Article 123 contained a rich lode of labor rights, including the right to unionize and strike, the eight-hour day, and equal pay for equal work regardless of one’s gender or nationality. This article also ignored Mexican reality. It prohibited child labor in an economy where such labor was essential for the survival of many families. It was clear to all that the provisions of Article 123 would not be implemented immediately.

Rather, they formed a statement of intent—a promise of better things to come. Miner Nicolás Cano, one of the few workers at the Convention, was prescient in noting that by protecting only “legal” strikes, Article 123 left the door open for business and government to jointly declare strikes illegal and oppress labor. The immediate impact of Article 123 was to convince the labor and peasant movements that they did not need a Villa or a Zapata to be included in the new order.

To correct what was perceived as an excessively weak presidency created by the 1857 constitution, the 1917 document created a strong presidency. Article 76 granted the Senate— which became subservient to the president—the right to remove state governors. Article 71 allowed the president to introduce legislation. As a result of this provision, most of the legislation passed for the rest of the century was in the form of presidential initiative. Article 72 allowed the president to veto legislation, but permitted Congress to override the veto with a two-thirds majority.

The constitution placed one crucial limit on this strong presidency. Article 83 prohibited both immediate presidential reelection and a later return to the presidency à la Porfirio Díaz in 1884. This reflected the belief that the ills of the Porfiriato resulted from Díaz’s repeated reelection.

With the single exception of 1928, this prohibition remained for the rest of the century. In addition, the immediate reelection of mayors and governors was prohibited. These prohibitions remain a cardinal principle of Mexican politics and have had a major impact on shaping the political system.

The 1917 constitution laid the foundation for an activist federal government that could defend the interests of poor Mexicans vis-à-vis hacendados and foreign capitalists. However, this activism took an unexpected form. Carranza and his successors not only wielded the power granted them in the constitution but also viewed it as a document that they could review, amend, or ignore to suit their generally conservative purposes. Despite its spotty application, the 1917 constitution did shape government action, and it remains in force to this day. It significantly influenced social thinking throughout Latin America, and its progressive provisions were widely adopted in legislation and constitutions elsewhere in the region.

In March 1917, elections were held to legitimize Carranza’s presidency. There was no organized opposition, and Carranza received more than 97 percent of the vote. Apparently the only ones to take the election seriously were foreigners. The British minister reported, “My chauffeur could not conceal his amusement when I told him that I wished to go and see the elections.”

Carranza faced a number of challenges once he assumed the presidency. He had to establish control vis-à-vis his rivals, especially Villa and Zapata, who still led irregular forces. Peasants and workers, having been mobilized by the Revolution, demanded that the government take measures to meet their aspirations. At the local level, entrenched warlords and active-duty generals, many of whom obtained power through the Revolution, defended their prerogatives. Implementing any sort of change required undercutting local interests and rebuilding loyalties to the national government. Given Mexico’s economic disarray, merely feeding the population presented a major challenge.

A fusion of Sonoran and Coahuilan groups formed Carranza’s ruling coalition. This leadership, with its northern middle-class roots, prioritized nationalism, not social reform. Just as with Madero before him, Carranza felt the Revolution was over. In June 1917, one of oilman Weetman Pearson’s representatives wrote:

A tendency to conservatism is observable now that the government is well established and is not so dependent on the radical military element. Undoubtedly Carranza is doing his utmost to free himself from the extremists, and the most hopeful sign is, that he is commencing to take into the government offices, some of the old regime.

Carranza shared the conviction of the Porfirian elite that land reform would be a disaster for the Mexican economy and that it would sharply reduce agricultural production. In keeping with this notion, he returned many seized estates to their pre-Revolutionary owners. He felt this would increase tax collection and food production and win the political support of those who recouped their land.

Carranza not only restored large estates to their pre-Revolutionary owners but also declared that he did not think “the agrarian problem important.” During the five years he exercised power, Carranza distributed only 988,000 acres—roughly the size of a large northern hacienda—to 67,193 beneficiaries.

Resistance to the Constitutionalists continued in Morelos, even though Carranza’s army returned to occupy the state in 1917. By 1919, Zapata’s dream had vanished as all the cities and haciendas were reoccupied and lands were returned to their former owners. The remaining Zapatistas were forced into the mountains. They no longer had a clear position. Some made overtures to the government while others spoke highly of the Russian Revolution.

Early in 1919, Zapata contacted Jesús Guajardo, a Carrancista colonel whom Zapata had heard was at odds with his commander. Zapata, desperate for men and supplies, suggested that Guajardo defect. Guajardo pretended he was deserting, along with his troops and their weapons. To convince Zapata of his sincerity, Guajardo even had his troops shoot men who had deserted Zapata and joined his force.

Guajardo met Zapata at Chinameca hacienda in Morelos. Upon entering the hacienda courtyard on April 10, 1919, Zapata was cut down by gunfire from an ambush that Guajardo had laid for him. For his part in the ambush, Guajardo was given 50,000 pesos and promoted to general. After Zapata’s death, the Zapatistas ceased to be a major political force. However, some Zapatistas did remain in the hills until 1920, when the political climate became more favorable.

Many of Carranza’s civil servants, especially at the municipal level, had served under Díaz. He purged progressives from the government and the army and replaced them with politicians and unprincipled militarists.              

Carranza’s civilian appointees began a trend toward personal enrichment through public office on a scale previously unmatched. Such enrichment not only satisfied the desires of those holding power but also bought off challengers. Although Carranza was personally honest, corruption became widespread during his administration. The tone of government changed so radically that by 1920 it was difficult to see any relation between government action and the 1917 constitution. After serving as a senator and governor under Díaz, Carranza, like Madero before him, had no desire to implement sweeping changes.

While Carranza failed to use the promise of social reform to consolidate power, there was someone who was a master at it—his old comrade-in-arms, Álvaro Obregón. After the 1917 Constitutional Convention, amid reports of growing rivalry between the two revolutionary leaders, Obregón resigned his position as secretary of war and “retired” to his estate in Sonora. While there, he profited greatly from brokering Sonora’s chickpea trade. Obregón kept abreast of political events and traveled to the United States, where he met with Secretary of State Robert Lansing.

By 1920, Obregón had allied himself with middle-class military men who were dissatisfied with the tenor of Carranza’s government. His new allies resented the unfulfilled promises of the

Revolution and the increasing power of hacendados. The enrichment of Carrancista officials,

widespread repression, and Carranza’s authorization of the assassination of Zapata only served to increase their dissatisfaction.

In 1919, Carranza attempted to impose his ambassador in Washington, Ignacio Bonillas, as his successor. Bonillas, a virtually unknown engineer who had trained at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, had such close ties to the United States that he was disparagingly referred to as “Meester Bonillas.” Carranza thought he could control Bonillas even after his term was over and thus maintain de facto power. He knew he could not control the outstanding general of the Revolution, Obregón.

In June 1919, Obregón announced his own presidential candidacy. His whistle-stop tours around the country drew enthusiastic crowds. Obregón was already experienced in mass politics, having promised the Yaqui land in exchange for their fighting in the Revolution and having promised workers labor rights in exchange for their formation of battalions during the Revolution. To bolster his presidential candidacy, he turned to organized labor for support. The response Obregón received in Tampico was typical of the labor support he received nationwide. There, at worker’s convention, responding to his charisma, his military record, and his promises of reform, endorsed Obregón over Bonillas by a vote of 1,082 to three in a straw poll.

While Obregón was campaigning, Carranza subpoenaed him to testify in a case involving an officer charged with rebellion. After arriving in Mexico City, Obregón, fearing arrest or assassination, fled to Guerrero disguised as a rail worker. There he formed an alliance with remnants of the Zapatista movement and called for revolt against Carranza. Obregón had the backing of reform-minded military men, peasants, and workers, who saw in him the hope for change. He also had strong backing in his home state of Sonora, where on April 23, 1920, two generals, Plutarco Calles and Adolfo de la Huerta, issued the Plan of Agua Prieta, which repudiated Carranza’s government. As was the case with Carranza’s Plan of Guadalupe, it lacked specific provisions for social reform.

Carranza failed to end rural violence, to fulfill the promises of the 1917 constitution, or to resolve the considerable economic problems the Revolution had created. He had little to offer the middle class, which had emerged as a major political force in the revolutionary army and at the Querétaro convention. The army was alienated by his having reduced military spending. The world recession following the end of the First World War exacerbated poverty in Mexico, making a mockery of the revolutionary slogans that had stoked the hopes of ordinary Mexicans.

On May 7, 1920, realizing that he had little political or military support, Carranza filled sixty rail cars with his backers and their weapons, files, and possessions, as well as gold bars from the national treasury. He set out along the traditional path of Mexico’s fallen leaders, down from the highlands toward Veracruz. He planned to reestablish his government there and launch a counteroffensive from the coast, just as he had successfully done in 1915.

However, Carranza found the rail line had been blocked by rebels well before he reached Veracruz. He abandoned the train and reached the village of Tlaxcalantongo, Puebla, on horseback. There, troops under the command of Rodolfo Herrero assassinated the president in the hut where he was sleeping. Herrero, who had ties to Generals Manuel Paláez and Félix Díaz, held a grudge since Carranza and Carranza’s appointee as governor of Puebla had ordered his father killed.

Obregon’s rapid victory in Mexico’s last successful armed revolt reflected the erosion of Carranza’s support. At the same time, given his military record, Obregón attracted broad military support as well as the backing of many workers and peasants who felt he would carry out the reforms promised in the constitution.

Given his background, it is not surprising that Carranza largely ignored the powerful social demands that emerged during the Revolution. Little progress was made at instilling democracy, as the elections that were held during Carranza’s term were generally considered a farce. Members of opposing factions were not allowed to nominate candidates and there were widespread accusations of fraud. Finally, as became obvious with the Plan of Agua Prieta, no means of presidential succession had been instituted.

Carranza’s strongest legacy is providing an institutional framework—the 1917 constitution— which his successors could build on. Carranza’s nationalism forms another part of his legacy. He increased the taxes on oil companies seven-fold between 1917 and 1920. He was not afraid to challenge foreigners’ property rights and existing contracts to further his nationalistic goals. He was not anti-capitalist or even anti-foreign and did not seek to eliminate foreign investment, but to control it. Carranza unsuccessfully attempted to force foreign oil companies to accept that the Mexican government, by virtue of Article 27, could radically redefine their oil rights.